This paper explores the increasing frequency with which regional human rights courts have made cross-references to the decisions of their counterparts in other regions. It asks whether this practice indicates that international human rights law is becoming more`universal' and the possible impacts of this outcome. It focuses specifically on recent jurisprudence concerning indigenous rights. Analysing points of convergence and divergence between regional courts, the paper advocates an interregional judicial dialogue which would produce a harmonised and universal interpretation and implementation of human rights standards.
Introduction
Fragmentation 1 and constitutionalization 2 have been regarded as two contradictory discourses in international law. 3 Furthermore, regionalization of human rights protection and proliferation of judicial organs have been considered to hinder consistency of human rights norms. Given that truth lies somewhere in between, this paper discusses harmonization of human rights norms through judicial interpretation by regional courts in indigenous rights cases. It first demonstrates the multiplication of regional human rights courts and their law-making function in general, and then turns to the case of indigenous peoples. It concludes that a dialectic interpretation of indigenous rights has been developed through regional jurisprudence. In this context, inter-regional judicial dialogue advances coherence of international human rights law, which could be regarded as a sign of constitutionalization, but not of its telos.
Regional Judiciaries in the Field of Human Rights
In the post-war era, the pursuit of peace was based upon international cooperation and unity through the realization of common ideals. Consequently, regional organizations emerged or were reformed with a view to`bring states into closer association' 4 and establish a common public order. 5 In this context, human rights gained paramount importance. After all, the proclamation of fundamental rights under the United Nations Charter and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) had marked`the internationalization of human rights and the humanization of international law' . 6 Apart from the political factors which enabled European cooperation, the UN's inaction led to decentralized action and the enforcement of human rights through regional instruments.
From a more theoretical perspective, the fragmentation of international law and the development of specialized or self-contained regional regimes enhanced the multiplication of regional human rights courts. Even though the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY ) has noted that`every tribunal is a self-contained system' , 7 there is no legal system which functions in isolation. 8 Judicial proliferation has been questioned as to whether it has any positive impact, 9 and regarded as a`systemic problem' , 10 whereas various concerns have been raised on the universality and coherence of international law. 11 Case law reflects such inconsistencies on the interpretation and implementation of international law in different courts. The case of Loizidou v Turkey, 12 for example, has been criticized as being inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on treaty interpretation. 13 Without disregarding these issues, international courts have responded to international concerns to strengthen the rule of law. Regional human rights regimes echo international human rights norms as enshrined in UDHR and later the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Given that international covenants served as the model for regional ones, the conventional framework is, to a large extent, reproduced with minor adjustments as analyzed subsequently.
The Regional Institutional Framework in a Comparative Perspective
Starting with Europe, which had suffered severely because of the disastrous World Wars I and II, the establishment of the Council of Europe resulted in the formation a human rights system within a year. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) created a framework for European human rights protection and stands as its cornerstone. From the very beginning, it became apparent that human rights protection would be a dead letter without the necessary supervisory mechanisms. 14 To ensure the observance of the Convention, two organs were set up: the European Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 15 The Commission could be either be informed on alleged breaches of the Convention by member states, or receive petitions from victims-individuals, groups and NGOs-against member states which have recognized the Commission's competence to do so. 16 Its main task was to secure a friendly settlement of the matter between the parties; otherwise the case would be referred to the European Court of Human Rights. The Council of Europe's Protocol No 11 (1998) reformed this rather complex structure, replacing the Commission and its filtering competence with a single European Court of Human Rights.
The significant role of the ECtHR in the field of human rights protection is undisputed. Two key achievements should be highlighted in particular. First of all, the accession of the vast majority of European states, including Russia and Turkey, to the Convention, establishes a European area with common human rights standards in and between member states. Secondly, the individual gains an active role as it has locus standi in front of the Court. This led to a significant increase in the number of applications to the ECtHR and gave rise to further institutional improvements. Protocol No 14 (2010) introduced new admissibility criteria with a view to address the increase in the Court's workload and backlog. Further, the newly adopted Protocol No. 15 underlines the principle of subsidiarity, whereas Protocol No. 16 will enable national courts to seek advisory opinions in the context of cases pending before it relating to the interpretation or application of the rights and freedoms defined in the ECHR or the protocols thereto. Although this envisages a wider role for the ECtHR similar to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the figures are discouraging since only 29 states have signed Protocol No. 15, of which only 10 states have ratified it.
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There is, at present, a sign of reluctance towards future constitutionalization of the human rights in the ECHR.
The Organization of American States (OAS) followed the European example, albeit with a delay, through the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) in 1969.
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The larger number of rights in the ACHR-the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in particular-reflects the regional particularities, 19 apart from which the institutional structure is quite similar to the ECHR. Two organs are entrusted with the supervision of the conventional framework, namely the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACmHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). The Commission is vested with the same competences as the ECtHR, including the friendly settlement of petitions brought by any person, group of persons or NGOs containing denunciations or complaints of violation of the ACHR by a State Party, 20 examination of inter-state communications, 21 or otherwise transfer cases to the IACtHR. Despite statutory limitations on the IACtHR's power to review cases, steps have been made for procedural improvements through the revision of Rules of Procedure of the respective organs in order to streamline their work and strengthen the status of the petitioner. 22 However, the American system follows the`two-tier structure' 23 that existed in the European system before 1998. Last but not least, the Organization of African Unity adopted the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights in 1981. 24 This instrument is innovative as it adapts to the African social reality and adds group rights to its protective regime. Unlike the other regional conventions, the Banjul Charter is limited to the creation of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACmHPR) as the only competent organ to ensure its implementation and address communications and/or complaints by states and non-state actors. 25 In 1998, the OAU adopted a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights with a view to enhance the efficiency of the African Commission. The relationship between the two organs is explicitly clarified under Apparently, the African human rights system has entered into a legal labyrinth, but the Ariadne's Thread is missing. 32 The outcomes of these amendments remain uncertain as the ratification of different legal instruments is required in order to render the new Court operational and effective. Thus, the role of the Commission remains crucial given its competencies in the field.
Thus, this analysis shows that regional human rights protective regimes are structured alike. Furthermore, the complementarity between each Commission and its respective Court denotes the unified procedure followed and their shared competences in the field which strengthens the value and impact of relevant case 
Development of Human Rights Law through Judicial Dialogue
Regional human rights courts are significantly different from international judicial organs, whose main responsibility is the peaceful settlement of legal disputes. 33 As the ECtHR noted in Loizidou v Turkey:
The International Court is called on inter alia to examine any legal dispute between States that might occur in any part of the globe with reference to principles of international law. The subject-matter of a dispute may relate to any area of international law. In the second place, unlike the Convention institutions, the role of the International Court is not exclusively limited to direct supervisory functions in respect of a law-making treaty such as the Convention. 34 Regional courts stand as the guardians of human rights protection. Their task is not only to ensure the observance of the engagements, 35 or the fulfillment, 36 of commitments undertaken by the contracting parties, but also to secure thè common interest' . 37 As Judge Cançado Trindade notes`the interpretation and application of human rights treaties have been guided by considerations of a superior interest or ordre public which transcends the individual interest of State Parties' . 38 Hence, judicial organs foster uniform implementation of human rights on a wider scale.
Judicial organs are further entrusted with the interpretation and application of the constitutive convention. 39 This signifies derogation from absolute legal positivism, since interpretation`gives meaning to norms and generates legal normativity' . 40 The general and often abstract wording of conventional provisions further enhances the need for judicial interpretation as it illustrates the content, scope and limitations of rights, 41 while at the same time developing conventional rules. 42 For instance, even though there is no provision on the right to environment under the ECHR, it has been held to be protected within the meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR-the right to respect for private and family life 43 -in the course of progressive jurisprudence. As a result, judicial lawmaking seems inextricably linked a court's function. 44 Judicial interpretation follows the general rules on treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 45 Emphasis is also placed on present-day standards 46 which reflect the evolutive features of international law. To this end, the ECHR 47 and ACHR 48 are regarded as`living instruments' which adapt to current realities. Regional consensus has a vital role in this process 40 as an element of shared interest and common standards within its respective regime emanating from an intra-regional perspective. Apart from regional perceptions, interpretation follows universalistic approaches, 49 as enshrined in the Vienna Declaration (1993) 50 according which`all human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent, and interrelated' . 51 In this context, the African Charter is not only innovative but also revolutionary. Article 60 and 61 enables the ACmHPR to draw lessons through the practice of other human rights organs when reviewing a case. Therefore, the ACmHPR endorses international law on human and peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various African instruments on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Charter of the United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other UN instruments and those adopted by African countries in the field of Human and Peoples' Rights, as well as from the provisions of various instruments adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of which the State Parties to the African Charter are members.
Similarly, both the ECtHR and the IACtHR follow general interpretation methods. Regional courts should`take into account developments in the corpus juris gentium of international human rights law over time and in present-day conditions' , 52 as`an international instrument must be interpreted and applied within the overall framework of the juridical system in force at the time of the interpretation' . 53 In this regard, the regional courts tranform`global soft law into regional hard law' . 54 49 In Purohit v The Gambia, the African Commission affirms that:`In interpreting and applying the African Charter, the African Commission relies on its own jurisprudence, and as provided by articles 60 and 61 of the African Charter, on appropriate and relevant international and regional human rights instruments, principles and standards. The African Commission is, therefore, more than willing to accept legal arguments with the support of appropriate and relevant international and regional human rights instruments, principles, norms and standards taking into account the well recognized principle of universality. However, the use of inter-court dialogue as an interpretative tool is complementary in nature serving as a guide for international practice. After all, given that international law is a consent-based system, the transplant of legal interpretations of other regional systems would contravene this general principle. 55 Despite criticisms that`judicial dialogue between regional tribunals is to some extent a monologue' , 56 as reference to African case law is scarce, such claims are not well-founded. Taking into consideration the organizational and operational features of each judicial system, the vast case law of the European and American regional Courts apparently offers a plethora of interpretative guidelines regarding a wide variety individual rights which served as interpretative guidelines for the African one. On the other hand, the African Commission shied away in developing rights where there was little concrete international jurisprudence. 57 Consequently, the development of human rights case law in each legal system defines the limits of intercourt dialogue.
In practical terms, the ECtHR has referred to the Inter-American human rights system in more than 50 cases regarding general practice or interpretation of particular human rights-e.g. enforced disappearances, exhaustion of domestic remedies, death penalty, torture, right to life, domestic violence etc.
58 -and vice versa. Likewise, the ECtHR has also taken African case law into consideration, although in a rather limited number of cases-e.g. 64 Accordingly, indigenous rights jurisprudence is analyzed in the following section from a comparative perspective, with a view to affirm the harmonization of human rights standards though judicial dialogue.
The Curious Case of Indigenous Rights
Indigenous rights are placed in the spotlight in this article for various reasons. First, indigenous people represent distinct groups and in particular, communities, peoples and nations which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop, and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems. 65 Secondly, standard-setting is underway, leaving room to`legalization of indigenous rights through human rights jurisprudence' . 66 Last, but not least, indigenous rights have been much debated in the course of inter-regional dialogue. Accordingly, the analysis in this article assesses current practice with a view to draw lessons and identify prospects and challenges in this field. 
The struggle for indigenous rights protection
Indigenous people had been traditionally deprived of rights or status, which enabled the legitimization of colonialism. 67 Nevertheless, the humanistic approach of the UN Charter brought about various international initiatives for the protection of human rights. The International Labour Organization (ILO) was innovative in the field of indigenous protection, with the General Conference adopting the Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention in 1957, 68 under which protection was laid upon integration of these populations to national community. The Convention was revised in 1989 by Convention No 169. 69 The`integration principle' was replaced by a participatory model based upon self-identification and respect. Both instruments gained little attention whereas the latter numbers only 22 ratifications.
Although the protection of the indigenous entered the UN agenda during the decolonization process, an international agreement was reached in 2007 with the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples by the General Assembly. 70 The Declaration establishes a universal framework of minimum protection and recognizes individual and collective rights. 71 Further, it reaffirms that indigenous individuals are entitled without discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, whereas indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their existence, well-being and integral development as peoples. 72 Indigenousness is closely linked with numerous characteristics and affinities, which confers a distinct identity and includes a common history, linguistic tradition, territorial connection and political outlook. 76 Thus, Judge Ziemele in his partly dissenting opinion in the Handolsdalen Sami Village v Sweden criticizes the majority's reasoning in that case for disregarding the indigenousness of the group despite analyzing their distinct characteristics. 77 In the absence of a binding legal instrument, indigenous protection rests upon international human rights law and the legalization of their rights through human rights jurisprudence. 78 In this respect,`classic individual rights have been re-read to accommodate communal perspectives in ways that challenge rigid dichotomies between the individual and the group within human rights law' , 79 transposing communal principles of indigenous people into an individualistic rights framework is not a task to be taken lightly' .
80
The right to lands traditionally owned, occupied or used by the indigenous 81 is indicative. Land disputes of this kind call for a reconceptualization of individual rights in accordance with the particular needs of indigenous peoples on a case-by-case basis. 82 As Pentassuglia notes, property to land lies at`the intersection of a critical understanding of possession and title and material and spiritual connection' as well as the exercise of traditional livelihoods. 83 For this reason, violation of land rights would even entail risk to economic, social and cultural development, the right to property, integrity of their persons, enjoyment of cultural rights and protection of tradition values.
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These critical remarks are discussed further in the context of interregional dialogue and its role in developing law below.
Indigenous rights discourse within interregional dialogue
Judicial dialogue has enabled the integration of international standards in regional systems as well as the harmonization between different regional systems. Besides, regional framework applies`with due regard to the particular principles of international human rights law governing the individual and collective 23-5. The African Commission instituted proceedings against Kenya for alleged serious and massive violations of the African Charter against the ogiek community of the Mau forest as it had issued an eviction notice with a view to create a reserved water catchment zone. The Commission ordered provisional measures as it found that the situation was one of extreme gravity and urgency, as well as there being a risk of irreparable harm. It unanimously ordered the respondent to reinstate the restrictions imposed on land transactions and refrain from any act that would or might irreparably prejudice the main application before the Commission.
interests of indigenous peoples' . 85 Common principles and standards have been formulated through extensive jurisprudential cross-references and incorporated in international instruments, such as the Declaration of Indigenous Rights. In this context, emphasis is put on the case Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya 86 as it stands as a typical example of intercourt dialogue summarizing the basic principles of indigenous protection.
Indigenous peoples as actors
Indigenous rights are conferred to peoples as collective subjects of international law and not only as members of such communities or peoples. Inter-American case law refers extensively to the UDHR, the 2007 Declaration, as well as the African legal framework. 87 As a result, states have a duty to guarantee the juridical personality of individual members of a community, which is evidently necessary for their enjoyment of other rights, 88 and recognize the juridical capacity of the members of the indigenous people to fully exercise these rights in a collective manner.
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Legal personality allows indigenous communities to enforce existing rights. In Indigenous Community Yakye Axa v Paraguay, the IACtHR stated that:
Indigenous communities, under Paraguayan laws, are no longer just a factual reality to become legal entities with the capacity to fully enjoy legal rights vested not only in its individual members, but in the community itself, that is endowed with its own singular 85 Ibid. existence. Legal personality is the legal mechanism granting them the necessary status to enjoy certain fundamental rights, such as the right to hold title to communal property and to demand protection against any breach thereof. 90 Consequently, the indigenous gain a primary role in the realization of their rights as they have evolved from victims to`actors of their own future' . 
Self-determination
Self-determination is an`evolving force' 92 in the context of indigenous protection. Although originally related to the decolonization process, it has gained a broader scope within indigenous rights protection and contains principles of selfidentification and autonomy. The indigenous are entitled to determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and have the right to autonomy or self-government. 93 Self-identification is a precondition for the exercise of that right. In determining indigenous status for individual members as well the group as a whole, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR) has transposed the IACtHR's criteria, such as the particular social, cultural and economic characteristics, the special bonds with their ancestral territories and the existence of internal determination, even partially, 94 by their own norms, customs, and/or traditions. 95 The sacred relationship of the community with their lands has been also a crucial element in defining indigenous communities, and as an indispensable element to full enjoyment of their cultural and religious rights.
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The distinctiveness of the group is not eroded by individual conduct. The fact that some individual members of the indigenous people may live outside of the traditional territory and in a way that may differ from the rest has no affect for the group as a whole, nor can it be used as a pretext to deny the people their right to juridical personality. 92 Ibid, 248. 93 UNDRIP, above n 70, Arts 3-5. 94 Self government and internal determination is an inherent right as proclaimed in the Declaration: ibid, Arts 4-6. 95 Saramaka, above n 88, para 84. 96 Endorois, above n 86, para 156. 97 Ibid, para 162.
Jurisprudence, thus, affirms that self-determination and autonomy set the framework within which indigenous peoples can be featured as a distinct group and their rights can be realized.
The duty to protect
States have a general duty to ensure the realization of rights and their unimpeded enjoyment. Paraguay, Paraguay had adopted a quite advanced legal framework of protection but did not have effective measures to promote and enforce the laws. The Court ruled that the state shall enact into its domestic laws within a reasonable time all the legislative, administrative or other measures necessary to enforce rights as well as to establish a mechanism to claim restitution of the ancestral lands of the members of indigenous communities. After all, international law gives real protection to human rights and imposes on the state the duty to give flesh and bone to`paper rights' .
Freedom of religion
In Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya, the complainants alleged religious violations such as denial of access to religious sites within the game reserve. The ACmHPR adhered to the position of the UN Human Rights Committee, 111 affirming that`freedom of conscience and religion should, among other things, mean the right to worship, engage in rituals, observe days of rest, and wear religious garb' , 112 and that the Endorois spiritual beliefs and ceremonial practices constituted a religion. 113 Religion practice is inextricably linked to ancestral lands in which religious sites are situated. Traditional land is of fundamental religious significance and is an inherent part of the exercise of religious practices and beliefs. Guided by the IACtHR's jurisprudence, 114 the ACmHPR acknowledges that expulsion from traditional lands:
[I]nterfered with the Endorois' right to religious freedom and removed them from the sacred grounds essential to the practice of their religion, and rendered it virtually impossible for the community to maintain religious practices central to their culture and religion.
Such restrictions are not only illegitimate in the absence of any significant public security interest or other justification, but also constitutes a disproportionate measure, 116 and manifestly violates freedom of religion. This case shows that inter-court dialogue advances indigenous religious protection in general. Moreover, it specifies its content, recognizing access to ancestral land as a significant element of religious freedom.
Property rights and indigenous communities
International rights have an autonomous meaning under international human rights law, which supersedes national legal definitions, 117 and individual rights are redefined in the context of indigenous people. The broad conception of property rights in relation to indigenous peoples is developed through regional jurisprudence and has been reaffirmed in the Endorois case, where the ACmHPR held that`the rights, interests and benefits of [indigenous] communities in their traditional lands constitute``property'' under the Charter and that special measures may have to be taken to secure such``property rights'' .' 118 Even in the absence of registered titles, 119 possession of the land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real title to obtain official recognition of that property. 120 Indigenous land rights imply the right of ownership rather than mere access, as`[o]nly de jure ownership can guarantee indigenous peoples' effective protection' . 121 Summing up common standards as co-formulated in the course of interregional cross references, the Commission affirmed that: recognition and registration of property title; (3) the members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith; and (4) the members of indigenous peoples who have unwillingly lost possession of their lands, when those lands have been lawfully transferred to innocent third parties, are entitled to restitution thereof or to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality. Consequently, possession is not a requisite condition for the existence of indigenous land restitution rights.
122
In this regard, the unlawful eviction of the indigenous from their ancestral land and destruction of their possession, even when it serves public need, constitutes a violation of right to property if limitations of the said right were not`proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued' .
123 Forced eviction also entails violations of the right to adequate housing which is inherent in property rights. 124 In addition, it constitutes a violation of the right to life as the living conditions of the community are incompatible with the principles of human dignity. 125 Finally, restrictions of land rights of indigenous people require prior consultation and compensation in order to be legitimate. Incorporating the criteria formed in Saramaka v Suriname, Moiwana v Suriname, 126 the ACmHPR set out three guarantees the attainment of which ensures the survival of indigenous in this situation: effective participation of indigenous people in conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any development, investment, exploration or extraction plan; reasonable benefit for the indigenous from any such plan within their territory; and a prior environmental and social impact assessment. In the light of an extensive overview of regional case law with regard to compensation on loss of land, the ACHPR concluded in the Endorois case that the
